BREIT 2017 Annual Report

39 with investigations by such authorities into submissions made by such financial institutions to the bodies that set LIBOR and other interbank offered rates. In such settlements, such financial institutions admitted to submitting rates to the BBA that were lower than the actual rates at which such financial institutions could borrow funds from other banks. Additional investigations remain ongoing with respect to other major banks and no assurance can be made that there will not be further admissions or findings of rate setting manipulation or that improper manipulation of LIBOR or other similar inter-bank lending rates will not occur in the future. Based on a review conducted by the Financial Conduct Authority of the U.K. (the “FCA”) and a consultation conducted by the European Commission, proposals have been made for governance and institutional reform, regulation, technical changes and contingency planning. In particular: (a) new legislation has been enacted in the United Kingdom pursuant to which LIBOR submissions and administration are now “regulated activities” and manipulation of LIBOR has been brought within the scope of the market abuse regime; (b) legislation has been proposed which if implemented would, among other things, alter the manner in which LIBOR is determined, compel more banks to provide LIBOR submissions, and require these submissions to be based on actual transaction data; and (c) LIBOR rates for certain currencies and maturities are no longer published daily. In addition, pursuant to authorization from the FCA, ICE Benchmark Administration Limited (formerly NYSE Euronext Rate Administration Limited) (the “IBA”), took over the administration of LIBOR from the BBA on February 1, 2014. Any new administrator of LIBOR may make methodological changes to the way in which LIBOR is calculated or may alter, discontinue or suspend calculation or dissemination of LIBOR. In a speech on July 27, 2017, Andrew Bailey, the Chief Executive of the FCA, announced the FCA’s intention to cease sustaining LIBOR after 2021. The FCA has statutory powers to require panel banks to contribute to LIBOR where necessary. The FCA has decided not to ask, or to require, that panel banks continue to submit contributions to LIBOR beyond the end of 2021. The FCA has indicated that it expects that the current panel banks will voluntarily sustain LIBOR until the end of 2021. The FCA’s intention is that after 2021, it will no longer be necessary for the FCA to ask, or to require, banks to submit contributions to LIBOR. The FCA does not intend to sustain LIBOR through using its influence or legal powers beyond that date. It is possible that the IBA and the panel banks could continue to produce LIBOR on the current basis after 2021, if they are willing and able to do so, but we cannot make assurances that LIBOR will survive in its current form, or at all. We cannot predict the effect of the FCA’s decision not to sustain LIBOR, or, if changes are ultimately made to LIBOR, the effect of those changes. Any such changes could increase our financing costs or decrease the income we earn on our real estate-related securities investments, which could impact our results of operations, cash flows and the market value of our investments. Risks Related to our Relationship with the Adviser and the Dealer Manager We depend on the Adviser to select our investments and otherwise conduct our business, and any material adverse change in its financial condition or our relationship with the Adviser could have a material adverse effect on our business and ability to achieve our investment objectives. Our success is dependent upon our relationship with, and the performance of, the Adviser in the acquisition and management of our real estate portfolio, and our corporate operations. The Adviser may suffer or become distracted by adverse financial or operational problems in connection with Blackstone’s business and activities unrelated to us and over which we have no control. Should the Adviser fail to allocate sufficient resources to perform its responsibilities to us for any reason, we may be unable to achieve our investment objectives or to pay distributions to our stockholders. The termination or replacement of the Adviser could trigger a repayment event under our mortgage loans for some of our properties and the credit agreement governing any of our lines of credit. Lenders for certain of our properties may request provisions in the mortgage loan documentation that would make the termination or replacement of the Adviser an event requiring the immediate repayment of the full outstanding balance of the loan. The termination or replacement of the Adviser could trigger repayment of outstanding amounts under the credit agreements governing our lines of credit that we may obtain. If a repayment event occurs with respect to any of our properties, our results of operations and financial condition may be adversely affected. The Adviser’s inability to retain the services of key real estate professionals could hurt our performance. Our success depends to a significant degree upon the contributions of certain key real estate professionals employed by the Adviser, each of whom would be difficult to replace. There is ever increasing competition among alternative asset firms, financial institutions, private equity firms, investment advisors, investment managers, real estate investment companies, real estate investment trusts and other industry participants for hiring and retaining qualified investment professionals and there can be no assurance that such professionals will continue to be associated with the us or the Adviser, particularly in light of our perpetual-life nature, or that replacements will perform well. Neither we nor the Adviser have employment agreements with these individuals and they may not